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Article 2

CONFLICTING INTERESTS AND BULK SALES
STATUTES
THE NEED FOR BULK SALES LEGISLATION

The protection to creditors of a fraudulent seller which
is afforded by the ordinary common law rules regarding
fraudulent conveyances broadly takes the form of a power
in the creditor to follow the goods and subject them to his
claims as if no sale had occurred so long as they have not
reached the hands of a purchaser for value without notice.'
To the extent that this power is available, therefore, the
security of acquisitions for the transferee is sacrificed.
Where the transferee has participated in the fraud or taken
with notice of it, or taken as a donee, this sacrifice of security of acquisitions at his expense in order to promote
security of contracts for the creditors of the transferor has
seemed eminently just. This is especially the case where the
creditor's claim is for the purchase price of the identical
goods previously supplied by him on credit which the
fraudulent seller in the instance has transferred to others
with the intention to put them out of reach of his creditors.
Within the last few decades certain fraudulent practices
in connection with selling out at a stroke the entire business
and stock of goods in the case of retail stores without paying the wholesalers and others who had in the instance
supplied the stock of goods on credit became conspicuous.2
The common law of fraudulent conveyances was found
relatively inadequate to afford such creditors substantial
protection since by the time they found out what had
1 See the topic "Fraudulent conveyances" in any work on Sales or in any
standard legal encyclopedia.

2 Billig, Bulk Sales Laws, A Study in Economic Adjustment, 77 U. or P.

LAW REv., 72, at pp. 75-78.

BULK SALES LEGISLATION

happened the goods were often in the hands of purchasers
for value without notice while the fraudulent seller had
disappeared with the proceeds.
ENACTMENT OF BuLx SALES STATUTES

Accordingly the National Association of Credit Men, acting largely in the interest of wholesalers and jobbers, the
type of creditor who suffers most directly from such frauds,
carried on a well organized legislatiye campaign for greater
protection to unpaid creditors in such cases.8 Thus originated the numerous statutes of well defined types known by
the generic term of bulk sales laws, some form of which is
now in force in every one of the forty-eight states.4
Speaking in the most general terms, and disregarding for
the moment the variations between the several types, these
statutes in substance provide that the sales denounced
therein shall be void as against the seller's creditors unless
such creditors are notified of the details of the deal a specified number of days in advance. If the statutory requirements are complied with the creditors are thus afforded the
opportunity to take such steps for their own protection, by
attachment or otherwise, while the goods are still available
and within the reach of legal process, as may seem to them
expedient. If the sale is carried through without complying
with the statutory requirements the transaction is operative
between the immediate parties to it.' The seller's creditors,
however, are given the power to follow the goods, by attachment or execution or other suitable process, as if no sale
had occurred, even though the purchaser is innocent of any
participation in any fraudulent intention and is admittedly
a purchaser for value without notice.'
8 Billig, supra note 2, at pp. 81-88.
Billig, supra note 2, at pp. 2-3, note; MONTcoMERY, CREDiT MANUAL OF
ComaucrAL LAWS (1929) pp. 10-12.
5 Escalle v. Mark, 43 Nevada 172, 183 Pac. 387, 5 A. L. R. 1512 (1919);
Newman v. Garfield, 104 AtI. 881, 5 A. L. R. 1507 (Vt. 1918).
6 See especially note 50 below.
4
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CONFLICTING INTE1MSTS INVOLVED

It is apparent, therefdre, that bulk sales statutes go far
beyond the common law of fraudulent conveyances in sacrificing the security of acquisitions for transferees in order
more effectually to promote security of contracts for the
creditors of the original seller. In favor of this new policy in
cases of this type can be adduced its wholesome tendency to
suppress a well defined type of fraudulent practices which
was causing large losses in the current marketing of goods,
the burden of which had to be carried as overhead expense
in the marketing system. The suppression of such fraudulent sales in bulk which these statutes have to a considerable degree achieved is in effect accomplished by putting
the burden on the buyer to see to it that the prescribed
steps are properly followed, at the peril in case of failure
of having the goods taken under appropriate process by the
seller's creditors as if no sale had occurred. To what extent
it is wise thus to put the burden on the buyer, sacrificing
his security of acquisitions even though he is a purchaser
for value without notice, for the sake of promoting greater
security of contracts for the seller's creditors and its resulting incidental economy in the marketing system, is a
broad question of policy. Any conclusion reached thereon
necessarily involves a determination for the instance of the
relative value or importance of conflicting interests, the
bearing of which on the general welfare is a matter on
which opinions may be sharply divided. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that different views have prevailed at
different times and places with respect to the desirable
range, the constitutiondlity, and the liberality of interpretation of bulk sales laws.
VARING TXPES oF BuxLx SALEs STATuTES

The variations of type among the bulk sales statutes
themselves readily indicate the presence of divergent opmions regarding the extent to which it is advisable to promote
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security of contracts for the seller's creditors at the expense of security of acquisitions for the buyer. Thus the
New York form of statute, which is at the present time in
force in by far the largest number of states,7 in brief requires the buyer to inform the seller's creditors at least five
days in advance of taking possession of the goods, and
makes him accountable for the goods to the seller's creditors
if the statute is not complied with. The Connecticut form of
statute, in force in but a few states, does not go so far.' The
Pennsylvania form of statute goes even farther in protecting the interests of the unpaid creditors by requiring the
buyer to see to it that the proceeds are applied to the payment of the creditors' claims and by making the seller
criminally liable for furnishing a false statement to the buyer.' The Montana form of statute embraces most of the
other features of the Pennsylvania statute, but does not require 'that notice be given to the seller's creditors.'0 The
Pennsylvania type of statute is said to give the seller's
creditors a larger degree of protection than the others, and
recent amendments to such statutes secured in their interest
in certain other states have embodied most of the features
of the Pennsylvania statute. The Pennsylvania form of
statute, granting to creditors the greatest degree of protection, naturally is the form most favored at the present time
by the outstanding proponents of bulk sales legislation."
CONFLICTING

INTERESTS AFECTING CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF TBM STATUTES

The decisions on the constitutionality of bulk sales legislation also conspicuously reveals the background of divergent views respecting the advisability of promoting security
Billig, supra note 2, at pp. 72-73.
Billig, supra note 2, at p. 74, giving summary of details.
9 Billig, supra note 2, at pp. 73-74.
10 Billig, supra note 2, at p. 74.
11 Billig, supra note 2, at p. 73, citing Montgomery, The Bulk Sales Law
as It Was Intended to Be and as It Is (1923) 25 CREDIT MoNTmLY 8.
7

8
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of contracts for the seller's creditors at the expense of security of acquisitions for the buyer. Among the earlier
cases, while the statutes were new and their operation and
effects seemed novel and unfamiliar, are some outstanding
decisions which held such statutes void because of their
alleged arbitrary and prohibited interference with liberty
of contract,1" or deprivation of property, 8 or deprivation of
the equal protection of the laws. 4 Some of the earlier
statutes were somewhat amended to remove such objections.
As such legislation has become more familiar, however, and
its operation and effects have been more clearly perceived,
the constitutionality of such legislation as a valid exercise
of the police power for the suppression of fraudulent marketing practices harmful to the public has been generally conceded.1 5
CONFLICTING INTERESTS REFLECTED IN STRICT OR LIBERAL
INTERPRETATION OF THE STATUTES

The fundamental difference of opinion regarding the advisability of promoting security of contracts for the seller's
creditors by the corresponding sacrifice of security of acquisitions for the buyer is constantly reflected in the controversies that currently arise over the interpretation and
application of the bulk sales statutes with regard to the
effect of non-compliance. On behalf of the seller's creditors
in novel doubtful cases are constantly invoked the arguments in favor of a liberal interpretation of such statutes,
12

Wright v. Hart, 182 N. Y. 330, 75 N. E. 404, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.)

338

(1905).
13 Block v. Schwartz, 27 Utah 387, 76 Pac. 22, 65 L. R. A. 308 (1904).
14 Block v. Schwartz, supra note 13.
15 Lemieux v. Young, 211 U. S. 489, 53 L. Ed. 295, 29 S. C. 174 (1909);
Boise Ass'n of Credit Men v. Ellis, 26 Idaho 438, 144 Pac. 6, L. R. A. 1915 E,
917 (1914); Appel Mercantile Co. v. Barker, 92 Neb. 669, 138 N. W. 1133 (1912);
Kett v. Masker, 86 N. J. L. 97, 90 Atl. 243 (1914); Klein v. Maravelas, 219 N.
Y. 383, 114 N. E. 809 (1916); R. C. Williams v. Fourth National Bank, 15 Oll.
477, 82 Pac. 496, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 334 (1905); Wilson v. Edwards, 32 Pa.

Super. Ct. 295 (1907); William Tackaberry Co. v. German State Bk., 39 S. D.
185, 163 N. W. 709 (1917); Marlow v. Ringer, 79 W. Va. 568, 91 S. E. 386,
L. R. A. 1917 D, 619 (1917).
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to carry out to the fullest their remedial provisions designed
to protect the seller's creditors by suppressing fraudulent
bulk sales in the marketing system. Similarly, in such new
doubtful cases, there is constantly invoked on behalf of the
buyer the arguments calling for strict construction of statutes in derogation of the common law, in order to preserve
for the buyer so far as possible his common law security of
acquisitions. Strict interpretation seems to have been more
common "6than liberal interpretation. As the familiarity of
bulk sales statute has increased, however, and their operation and effects have been more clearly perceived, liberality of interpretation to carry out their object of suppressing a certain type of fraud in the marketing system has
been gaining ground somewhat. 17 It is by no means settled,
16 The following cases expressly avow a strict interpretation of bulk sales
statutes: McKelvey v. John Schaap & Sons Drug Co., 143 Ark. 477, 220 S. W.
827 (1920); Swafford v. Ketchum, 9 S. W. (2d) 806 (Ark. 1928); Cooney, Eckstein & Co. v. Sweat, 133 Ga. 511, 66 S. E. 257, 25 L. R. A.. (N. S.) 758 (1909);
Bowen v. Quigley, 165 Mich. 337, 130 N. W. 690 (1911); Balter v. Crum, 199
Mo. App. 380, 203 S. W. 566 (1918); Markarian v. Whitmarsh, 78 N. H. 1, 95
AtL 788 (1915); Blanchard Co. v. Ward & LeMay, 124 Wash. 204, 213 Pac. 929,
33 A. L. R. 59 (1923); Lewis, Hubbard & Co. v. Loughran, 85 W. Va. 235, 101
S. E. 465 (1919); Prokopovitz v. Chimka, 170 Wis. 190, 174 N. W. 448 (1919).
In the following cases a strict interpretation is exemplified without much direct
discussion of the point: Farrow v. Farrow, 136 Ark. 140, 206 S. W. 134 (1918);
D. C. Goff Co. v. First State Bank of DeQueen, 175 Ark. 158, 298 S. W. 884
(1927); Wasserman v. McDonnell, 190 Mass. 326, 76 N. E. 959 (1906); KellyBuckley Co. v. Cohen, 195 Mass. 585, 81 N. E. 297 (1907); Freeman v. Collard,
163 N. E. 166 (Mass. 1928); Hannah & Hogg v. Richter Brewing Co., 149 Mich.
220, 112 N. W. 713, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 178 (1907); Ferrat v. Adamson, 53
Mont. 172, 163 Pac. 112 (1917); Appel Mercantile Co. v. Kirtland, 105 Neb.
494, 181 N. W. 151 (1920); Johnson v. Kelly, 32 N. D. 116, 155 N. W. 683
(1915); R. C. Williams v. Fourth National Bank, 15 Okla. 477, 82 Pac. 496, 2
L. R. A. (N. S.) 334 (1905); Mayfield Co. v. Harlan & Harlan, 184 S. W. 313
(Tex. Civ. App. 1916); Peterson v. Doak, 43 Wash. 251, 86 Pac. 663 (1906);
Kasper v. Spokane Merchants' Ass'n., 87 Wash. 447, 151 Pac. 800 (1915); Maskell
v. Alexavdir, 100 Wash. 16, 170 Pac. 350, L. R. A. 1918 C, 929 (1918).
17 Liberality of interpretation was avowed in the following cases: Linn
County Bank v. Davis, 103 Kan. 672, 175 Pac. 972, 9 A. L. R. 468 (1918);
£Mutz v. Sanderson, 94 Neb. 293, 143 N. W. 302 (1913); Bailen v. Badger Import Co., 99 Neb. 24, 154 N. W. 850 (1915); Escalle v. Mark, 43 Nevada 172,
183 Pac. 387, 5 A. L. R. 1512 (1919); Douglas Fir Lumber Co. v. Star Lumber
Co., 27 N. M. 403, 201 Pac. 867, 41 A. . R. 1474 (1921); Pennell v. Robinson,
164 N. C. 257, 80 S. E. 417 (1913); Beene v. National Liquor Co., 198 S. W.
596 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917). Liberality of interpretation, at least with regard to
certain items, was exemplified without much direct discussion on the point in
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however, how far a liberal interpretation of such statutes
will in novel doubtful situations be adopted. The arguments
for strict or for liberal interpretation may on occasion appeal
to the court with greater force in one type of case than it
does in another, and examples of strict and of liberal interpretation of such statutes under variant facts may readily be
18
found in the same jurisdiction.
While the application of the bulk sales law in any given
jurisdiction necessarily requires careful study of the local
statute in the light of its local precedents, the current trends
of interpretation of such statutes may be briefly set forth
in the groupings of fact situations that are set out below. In
the controversy over strict or liberal interpretation of the
statute as applied to each group type of facts thus set out
is readily observed the constantly recurring conflict of interests as between security of contracts for the seller's creditors
and security of acquisitions for the buyer.
THE SAm-TRANSACTIONS Covmw_

The language of the various bulk sales statutes at times
varies a little regarding what transactions are included within their scope, but the most common terms employed on this
point are "sale, transfer, or assignment," or "sale, trade, or
other disposition" of a stock of merchandise in bulk. What
range of transactions falls within the scope of these terms
has naturally been a fertile source of litigation in doubtful
cases on the borderline in instances where the statute has
not been complied with. Thus it has often been held, construing the statute strictly, that it does not apply to the
the following cases: Gallus v. Elmer, 193 Mass. 106, 78 N. E. .772 (1906);
Bailen v. Badger Import Co., 99 Neb. 24, 154 N. W. 850 (1915); Midland Shoe
Co. v. A. L. & K. Dry Goods Co., 281 S. W. 344 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926); Marlow
v. Ringer, 79 W. Va. 568, 91 S. E. 386, L. R. A. 1917 D, 619 (1917).
18 See instances of the same jurisdiction furnishing cases listed in each of
the two foregoing notes.
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giving of a chattel mortgage on the stock of merchandise.1 9
Some of the more recent cases, construing the statute more
liberally, have held that i*t applies to such cases.20 Occasionally it is held that the statute does not apply to the giving
of a chattel mortgage but applies to the foreclosure proceedings thereunder. 2 1 Where the form of a chattel mortgage

with its defeasance is employed collusively to accomplish the
effect of a sale the court will look through the form to the
substance and hold the statute applicable.2 2 Where the
transaction is not a sale to an outside purchaser but a transfer to one of several creditors, who thus obtains a preference, a similar conflict of authority has arisen. Given a strict
construction the statute has been held not applicable, the
goods in such cases not being withdrawn from the reach of
creditors but disposed of in paying creditors.2 8 Construed
more liberally, however, the statute has been held applicable
to such transfers, impairing as they do the property available for attachment by other creditors.2 4 Construed strictly
on the point the statute has been held inapplicable to a
sale by one partner to the other of his interest in the busi19 Farrow v. Farrow, 136 Ark. 140, 206 S. W. 134 (1918); Wasserman v.
McDonnell, 190 Mass. 326, 76 N. E. 959 (1906); Mills v. Sullivan, 222 Mass.
587, 111 N. E. 605 (1916); Hannah & Hogg v. Richter Brewing Co., 149 Mich.
220, 112 N. W. 713, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 178 (1907); Appel Mercantile Co. v.
Kirtland, 105 Neb. 494, 181 N. W. 151 (1920); Waldrep v. Exchange State Bank,
197 Pac. 509, 14 A. L. R. 747 (Okla. 1921).
20 Linn County Bank v. Davis, 103 Kan. 672, 175 Pac. 972, 9 A. L.. R. 468
(1918); Beene v. National Liquor Co., 198 S. W. 596 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917).
21 Olean Milling Co. v. Tyler, 208 Mo. App. 430, 235 S. W. 186 (1921). Of
course the statute has no application, however, to a foreclosure sale under a
previous valid chattel mortgage. Faeth Co. v. Bressie, 125 Kan. 425, 264 Pac.
1077, 57 A. L. R. 1046 (1928).
22 Schwartz v. King Realty & Investment Co., 94 N. J. L. 134, 109 Atl. 567,
9 A. L. R. 471 (1920); Waldrep v. Exchange State Bank, 197 Pac. 509, 14
A. L. R. 747 (Okla. 1921).
23 Peterson v. Doak, 43 Wash. 251, 86 Pac. 663 (1906); Kasper v. Spokane
Merchants' Ass'n., 87 Wash. 447, 151 Pac. 800 (1915) (assignment for benefit of
a named list of preferred creditors).
24 Gallus v. Elmer, 193 Mass. 106, 78 N. E. 772 (1906); Bailen v. Badger
Import Co., 99 Neb. 24, 154 N. W. 850 (1915) (transfer to trustees for benefit
of such creditors as should agree to take their pro rata share of the goods and
release the debtor's personal liability).
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ness,25 while a more liberal construction of th6 statute has
led to the conclusion that it was applicable to the sale of an
interest in the business to an incoming partner.2 6 A few
27
additional illustrations are given in the footnote.
TnE

SAME-GOODS COVERED

Bulk sales statutes according to their terms usually apply
to the sale of a "stock of merchandise" in bulk. Giving such
language a strict interpretation, it is applicable only to such
articles as the merchant keeps for sale in the ordinary
course of his business. Accordingly it has been held not to
apply to the fixtures,2" equipment,2 9 appliances,30 manufactuter's stock of raw materials,"' or restaurant keeper's
stock of provisions.3 After decisions of this sort had been
25 Schoeppel v. Pfannensteil, 122 Kan. 630, 253 Pac. 567, 51 A. L. R. 398
(1927).
26 Marlow v. Ringer, 79 W. Va. 568, 91 S. E. 386, L. R. A. 1917 D, 619
(1917).
27 Conquest v. Atkins, 123 Me. 327, 122 AUt. 858 (1923) (bulk sales statute,
held applicable to the sale of merchandise in broken lots not in the ordinary
course of business, at least in the absence of proof of an established custom
among retail dealers to sell broken lots at the end of the season); Maskell v.
Alexander, 100 Wash. 16, 170 Pac. 350, L. R. A. 1918 C. 929 (1918) (bulk sales
statute, strictly construed held inapplicable to a transfer of the business and
stock of merchandise to a corporation in exchange for all the capital stock of
the corporation); Blanchard Co. v. Ward & LeMay, 124 Wash. 204, 213 Pac.
929, 33 A. L. R. 59 (1923) (bulk sale statute, strictly construed, not applicable
to sale of a mere portion, a department, etc., not amounting to "substantially
the entire stock of goods" as stated in the statute).
28 Boise Ass'n of Credit Men v. Ellis, 26 Idaho 438, 144 Pac. 6, L. R. A.
1915 E, 917 (1914) (after this decision, the Idaho statute was amended, however,
to include fixtures); Gallus v. Elmer, 193 Mass. 106, 78 N. E. 772 (1906); Lee
v. Gillen & Boney, 90 Neb. 730, 134 N. W. 278 (1912); Swift & Co. v. Tempelos,
178 N. C. 487, 101 S. E. 8, 7 A. L. R. 1581 (1919); Johnson v. Kelly, 32 N. D.
116, 155 N. W. 683 (1915).
29 Johnson v. Kelly, 32 N. D. 116, 155 N. W. 683 (1915); Golden Rod
Milling Co. v. Connell, 164 Pac. 588 (Ore. 1917) (machinery and appliances of
a mill); Lewis, Hubbard & Co. v. Loughran, 85 W. Va. 235, 101 S. E. 465 (1919)
(lunch wagon, with its equipment and supplies).
30 Bowen v. Quigley, 165 Mich. 337, 130 N. W. 690 (1911) (tools, vehicles,
and appliances used in connection with a retail coal business); McPartin v.
Clarkson, 240 Mich. 390, 215 N. W. 390, 54 A. L. R. 1535 (1927) (pool tables
in pool room); Ferrat v. Adamson, 53 Mont. 172, 163 Pac. 112 (1917) (pool
tables in a pool hail).
31 Lee v. Gillen & Boney, 90 Neb. 730, 134 N. W. 278 (1912).
32 Swift & Co. v. Tempelos, 178 N. C. 487, 101 S. E. 8, 7 A. L. R. 1581
(1919).
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rendered by the courts the. statute in question has in various states been so amended at the instance of the creditor
group as to apply,, at least to some extent, to fixtures.38 The
exact present range of the language used in the statute of
any given state must therefore be found by carefully consulting the local legal materials. More liberally construed in
the instance, the statute has been held applicable to the sale
of the stock of merchandise in a store although the store
was operated by the selling corporation merely as an incident to its large plantation operations, its tenants obtaining
their supplies at the store.34 Still more liberally construed
in another instance, the statute has been held applicable to
the sale of the stock of merchandise in a warehouse from
which a chain of retail stores owned by the seller were regularly supplied.35
THE SAME-SELLERS COVERED

Narrowly construed, the language of the bulk sales statute
relating to "merchandise" has been held to confine its application to sales by merchants, traders, or dealers in such
articles." Accordingly the statute does not apply to a sale
in bulk of the property used in connection With a livery and
boarding stable business.3 7 Similarly, the statute has been
held inapplicable to the sale of a restaurant business, even
though a cigar stand and soda fountain were maintained
incidental thereto. 38 So, also the statute has been held inapplicable to the sale of an automobile repair shop with its
stock of automobile parts, even though occasional sales of
parts had from time to time been made therefrom. 9 The
statute does not apply to the sale of his manufactured prod33
Milling
34
35
36
37
38

A reference to such amendment is found, for instance, in Golden Rod
Co. v. Connell, 164 Pac. 588 (Ore. 1917).
Prins v. American Fruit Co., 275 S. W. 914 (Ark. 1925).
Keller v. Fowler, 148 Tenn. 571, 256 S. W. 879 (1923).
Grove Mfg. Co. v. Salter, 106 S. E. 208, (Ga. App. 1921).
Balter v. Crum, 199 Mo. App. 380, 203 S. W. 566 (1918).
D. C. Goff Co. v. First State Bank of DeQueen, 175 Ark. 158, 298 S. W.

884 (1927).
39 Fisk Rubber Co. v. Hinson Auto

Co.,

168 Ark. 418, 270 S. W. 605 (1925).
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uct by a manufacturer.4" On the other hand, the bulk sales
statute has been interpreted to apply to the sale of the
stock of merchandise of a wholesale business 11 as well as
of a retail business, and its application to the merchandising business is not affected by the fact that the proprietor
is also carrying on other lines of business than merchandising." Under the especially broad provisions adopted in
Illinois, it is held that the bulk sales statute is applicable to
sales made by farmers " as well as to sales by other people
in business. With the ever changing combination of activities in the business field it is thus readily apparent that the
fundamental underlying conflict of interest as between security of contracts for the seller's creditors and security of
acquisitions for the buyer may be fought out afresh at any
time under the guise of a struggle between the respective
advocates of liberal and of strict interpretation of the bulk
sales statutes in their application to novel situations.
THE SAME-CREDITORS COVERED

Very strictly construed, bulk sales statutes do not enable
omitted creditors of the seller to take the goods from the
purchaser where the purchaser complies with the statute
with respect to creditors listed by the seller even though the
fraudulent seller deliberately omitted certain creditors from
40 Root Refineries v. Gay Oil Co., 171 Ark. 129, 284 S. W. 26, 46 A. L. R.
979 (1926) (dictum); Connecticut Steam Brown Stone Co. v. Lewis, 86 Conn.
386, 85 Atl. 534 (1912) (stone cutter selling the product of his own labor on
raw materials bought for the purpose); Cooney, Eckstein & Co. v. Sweat, 133
Ga. 511, 66 S. E. 257, 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 758 (1909) (sawmill selling the
product of its own manufacture); Nichols, North, Buse Co. v. Green County
Canneries, 205 N. W. 804, 41 A. L. R. 1211 (Wis. 1925) (cannery selling its entire Oroduction for the season).
41 Root Refineries v. Gay Oil Co., 171 Ark. 129, 284 S. W. 26, 46 A. L. R.
979 (1926); Niklaus v. Lessenhop, 99 Neb. 803, 157 N. W. 1019 (1916).
42 Root Refineries v. Gay Oil Co., 171 Ark. 129, 284 S. W. 26, 46 A. L. R.
979 (1926) (incidentally also manufacturing to some extent); Prins v. American
Fruit Co., 275 S. W. 914 (Ark. 1925) (retail store an adjunct to a large plantation
business).
43 Hall v. Main, 34 F. (2d) 528 (1929); Weskalnies v. Hesterman, 288 I1.
199, 123 N. E. 314, 4 A. L. R. 128 (1919).
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the list." More liberally construed, however, such statutes
enable any omitted creditor to treat the sale as void as to
him." Such statutes do not apply in favor of subsequent
creditors, whose claims have been incurred after the bulk
sales in question, 6 nor in favor of creditors whose claims
are barred by .the statute of limitations." They apply, however, in favor of all prior creditors who hold valid claims,
irrespective of whether such claims originated in dealings
concerning the identical goods,4" and such claims need not
have been already reduced to judgment.49
TnE SAm-Pux CAsE s APPECTED

There seems to have been little question under the usual
wording of bulk sales statutes, namely, "void as to creditors" without excepting bona fide purchasers, that the seller's
creditors may by using appropriate process follow the goods
and take them from the purchaser as if there had been no
sale even though the purchaser is a purchaser in good faith
for value without notice.50 In this respect, therefore, it is
easily seen that bulk sales statutes go much farther in protecting the seller's creditors at the expense of the purchaser
than do the ordinary common law rules relating to fraudulent conveyances. Whether bulk sales statutes should be so
44 McKelvey v. John Schaap & Sons Drug Co., 143 Ark. 477, 220 S. W. 827
(1920);.Swafford v. Ketchum, 9 S. W. (2d) 806 (Ark. 1928).
45 Lindstrom v. Spicher, 205 N. W. 231, 41 A. L..R. 968 (N. D. 1925);
Oregon Mill & Grain Co. v. Hyde, 169 Pac. 791 (Ore. 1918).
46 Faeth Co. v. Bressie, 125 Kan. 425, 264 Pac. 1077, 57 A. L. R. 1046
(1928); Kimball v. Cash, 176 N. Y. S. 541 (1919).
47 Fisher v. Woodard, 103 Neb. 253, 170 N. W. 907 (1919).
48 Prins v. American Trust Co., 275 S. W. 914 (Ark. 1925); Interstate
Rubber Co. v. Kaufman, 98 Neb. 562, 153 N. W. 585 (1915); Cech v. Costello,
117 Neb. 224, 220 N. W. 236 (1928) (claim for wages as farm laborer); Lildstrom v" Spicher, 205 N. W. 231, 41 A. L. R. 968 (N. D. 1925) (county with
claim for taxes).
49 Scheve v. Vanderkolk, 97 Neb. 204, 149 N. W. 401 (1914).
50 Prins v. American Trust Co., 275 S. W. 914 (Ark. 1925); Adams v.
Young, 200 Mass. 588, 86 N. E. 942 (1909); Farrar v. Lonsby Lumber & Coal Co.,
149 Mich. 118, 112 N. W. 726 (1907); Interstate Rubber Co. v. Kaufman, 98
Neb. 562, 153 N. W. '585 (1915) ; Pennell v. Robinson, 164 N. C. 257, 80 S. B. 417
(1913); Fechheimer-Keiffer Co. v. Burton, 128 Tenn. 682, 164 S. W. 1179, 51
L. R. A. (N. S.) 343 (1914).
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liberally construed in the interest of the seller's creditors
as to permit them to follow the goods even through successive later transfers is open to much greater question. A few
cases have given or suggested such far-reaching effect for
the statute in the instance involved. 5 ' In this view, "void as
to creditors" is regarded as equally applicable to remote subsequent sales by the buyer to sub-purchasers as it is to the
first sale by the fraudulent seller to the buyer. Most of the
authorities to date, however, reject this liberal interpretation of the statute on the point and hold instead, interpreting the statute strictly, that purchasers for value without
notice from the original buyer are protected even though the
original sale was not in compliance with the bulk sales
statute.52 Applying the analogy of fraudulent conveyances
where the bulk sales statute does not expressly conclude the
point, the weight of authority gives complete effect to resales by the buyer, conceiving that the broader construction
of the statute would involve both unnecessary restraint upon
trade and unmerited hardship upon innocent subsequent
buyers, which could not have been intended by the legislature.5" According to this view the additional protection to
the seller's creditors realizable from a power to follow the
goods through successive later transfers is not regarded as
51 Kett v. Masker, 86 N. J. L. 97, 90 At. 243 (1914) (dictum); Mayfield
Co. v. Harlan & Harlan, 184 S. W. 313 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916) (dictum); Midland
Shoe Co. v. A. L. & K. Dry Goods Co., 281 S. W. 344 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926).
52 McKelvey v. John Schaap & Sons Drug Co., 43 Ark. 477, 220 S. W. 827
(1920); Grove Mfg. Co. v. Salter, 106 S. E. 208 (Ga. App. 1921); Kelly-Buckley
Co. v. Cohen, 195 Mass. 585, 81 N. E. 297 (1907); Markarian v. Whitmarsh, 78
N. H. 1, 95 Atl. 788 (1915); Kasper v. Spokane Merchants' Ass'n., 87 Wash.
447, 151 Pac. 800 (1915); Prokopovitz v. Chimka, 170 Wis. 190, 174 N. W.
448 (1919). It is intimated in Scheve v. Vanderkolk, 97 Neb. 204, 149 N. W.
401 (1914), and Niklaus v. Lessenhop, 99 Neb. 803, 157 N. W. 1019 (1916), that
for the subsequent purchaser to be protected the sale to him by the first buyer
must itself have been in compliance with the bulk sales statute. Even this, however, is in Markarian v. Whitmarsh, 78 N. H. 1, 95 Atl. 788 (1915), said to be
unnecessary.
53 This argument is most deliberately formulated in Kasper v. Spokane
Merchants' Ass'n., 87 Wash. 447, 151 Pac. 800 (1915).
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worth the sacrifice of the interests of such subsequent innocent parties both in security of acquisitions and in freedom
of commerce.
THE SA i---CREDDIToR'S PTDIS

The several distinctive types of bulk salei statutes, as
already intimated above, themselves differ as to the extent
of protection that is available to the seller's creditors thereunder.5" One of the most important provisions respecting
creditors' remedies, which is common to most of the
statutes, is that any purchaser who shall not conform to the
provisions of the statute shall upon the application of any
of the creditors of the seller become a receiver and be held
accountable to such creditors for all the goods that have
come into his hands by virtue of such sale. This provision
has been rather liberally interpreted, once the fact of noncompliance with the statute is established as against the
buyer affected, to justify resort to a wide range of remedies
for creditors of the seller. Liberal interpretation in the interest of the creditor with respect to the remedies to which he
may resort has been applied much more freely than with respect to what purchasers are affected, for instance, where
strict interpretation has been customary in the interest of
security of property and freedom of commerce for later
parties. Thus it is usually said that attachment or execution
against the goods at the creditor's instance is an appropriate
remedy15 5 although instances of a stricter interpretation not
going so far may be found.5 6 Such attachment furnishes, a
good defense to replevin proceedings.5" It has also been held
that the buyer where the statute has not been complied with
may be sued in trover as a converter for the value of the
54

See footnotes 7-11 above.

55

Mutz v. Sanderson, 94 Neb. 293, 143 N. W. 302 (1923); Dickinson v.

Harbison, 78 N. J. L. 97, 72 Ati. 941 (1909); Wilson v. Edwards, 32 Pa. Super.
Ct. 295 (1907);. Prokopovitz v. Chimka, 170 Wis. 190, 174 N. W. 448 (1919)

(dictum).

56 Newman v. Garfield, 104 AtL 881, 5 A. L. R. 1507 (Vt. 1918).
57 Kett v. Masker, 86 N. J. L. 97, 90 Ati. 243 (1914).
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goods.58 Where the buyer has in turn already disposed of
the goods it is generally held that he can be subjected to
garnishment for the proceeds.5" Where for various reasons
these legal remedies may be inadequate in the instance to
accomplish redress for the creditor, it is held that a creditor's bill in equity or suit moulded on equitable grounds may
be brought to meet the situation and do justice to the various parties. ° In accord with the view that the remedial
provision of the statute is to be construed liberally for the
protection of the creditors, it is also held that where the buyer has commingled the goods in question with other goods,
rendering them indistinguishable, the creditors' remedies
may be exercised with respect to the entire commingled
mass.6 So, a creditor does not waive the berkefits to which
he is entitled under the bulk sales statute by permitting
one of his employees to participate in an appraisal that is
made in the deal between the seller and buyer.62 Similarly,
interpreting these provisions liberally, where the buyer has
paid designated creditors of the seller, and the sale is later
58

Conquest v. Atkins, 123

Me. 327, 122 Atl. 858 (1923);

Douglas Fir

Lumber Co. v. Star Lumber Cb., 27 N. M. 403, 201 Pac. 867, 41 A. L. R.
1474 (1921).
59

Appel Mercantile Co. v. Barker, 92 Neb. 669, 138 N. W. 1133 (1912);

Interstate Rubber Co. v. Kaufman, 98 Neb. 562, 153 N. W. 585 (1915); Home
Pattern Co. v. Gore, 113 Neb. 535, 204 N. W. 68 (1925); Oregon Mill & Grain
Co. v. Hyde, 169 Pac. 791 (Ore. 1918); Kell Milling Co. v. H. 0. Wooten Groc-

ery Co., 195 S. W. 342 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917). In several cases it has been held
or intimated that garnishment for the value of the goods is equally available
against the buyer whether or not he has previously resold the goods: Mutz v.
Sanderson, 94 Neb. 293, 143 N. W. 302 (1913); Cech v. Costello, 117 Neb. 224,
220 N. W. 236 (1928); Prokopovitz v. Chimka, 170 Wis. 190, 174 N. W. 448

(1919)
60

(dictum).
Scheve v. Vanderkolk, 97 Neb. 204, 149 N. W. 401 (1914); Niklaus v.

Lessenhop, 99 Neb. 803, 157 N. W. 1019 (1916); William Tackaberry Co. v.
German State Bank, 39 S. D. 185, 163 N. W. 709 (1917).
61 Mutz v. Sanderson, 94 Neb. .293, 143 N. W. 302 (1913); Marlow v.
Ringer, 79 W. Va. 568, 91 S..E. 386, L. R. A. 1917 D, 619 (1917).

62 Home Pattern Co. v. Gore, 113 Neb. 535, 204 N. W. 68 (1925).
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avoided at the instance of omitted creditors, such buyer is
entitled to be subrogated to the position of the creditors he
has paid. 3
A few courts, however, have applied a stricter interpretation of the provisions of the bulk sales statute with respect to the creditors' remedies. Thus, it has been held that
quasi-contractual redress is not available against the buyer, 4 but that creditors must proceed in equity to have the
sale set aside, 5 even though such narrow construction on
the point is opposed by the weight of authority.
Lauriz Vold.
University of Nebraska, College of Law.

63 Adams v. Young, 200 Mass. 588, 86 N. E. 942 (1909) ; Fechheimer-Keiffer
Co. v. Burton, 128 Tenn. 682, 164 S. W. 1179, 51 L. R. A. (N. S.) 343 (1914).
64 Freeman v. Collard, 163 N. E. 166 (Mass. 1928). In Anthony Wholesale
Grocery Co. v. Otto Weiss Milling Co., 227 Pac. 374 (Kan. 1924), it was held
that a creditor's merely suing the purchaser for the debt established no priority
over other creditors with respect to the goods.
65 Newman v. Garfield, 104 AUt. 881, S 'A. L. R. 1507 (Vt. 1918).

